Philosophy

Inspección de Filosofía establece como Pautas de Evaluación una serie de recomendaciones, en acuerdo con el Reglamento de Evaluación y Pasaje de Grado vigente, que sirvan como criterios orientadores para los docentes de la asignatura y para los estudiantes que rinden exámenes en carácter de Libres. PAUTAS PARA LA EVALUACIÓN 1ER. AÑO BACHILLERATO REFORMULACIÓN 2006 Cuestiones administrativas Se utiliza una sola libreta en tanto se trata de un solo espacio curricular. Se identifican las clases de Crítica de los Saberes en el registro de la libreta. Se identifican también con algún código las calificaciones correspondientes a crítica de los Saberes. Aunque las modalidades de evaluación serán diferentes, las calificaciones mensuales, trimenstrales y finales darán lugar a una sola nota, resultante de promediar Crítica de los Saberes con Filosofía. EVALUACIÓN DE PROCESOS Evaluación en Filosofía  Entendiendo la evaluación como parte del proceso de enseñanza y aprendizaje, se sugiere alternar distintas modalidades de evaluación que permitan tener información sobre la forma y el grado en que los alumnos se han apropiado de los saberes y en que han consolidado las habilidades propias del pensamiento crítico que se proponen desarrollar en el curso. Esto permitirá al docente una eventual revisión de la planificación inicial.  Se recomienda planificar las pruebas especiales de manera que las propuestas demanden de los alumnos la reconstrucción crítica de la información y que no se limiten a requerir la mera reproducción mecánica de conocimientos. El docente compartirá con los estudiantes los criterios de evaluación, explicitándolos y explicando previamente a la realización de la prueba. Evaluación en Crítica de los Saberes En la presentación del Programa se aclara: "La evaluación de crítica de los Saberes se hará a través de un breve ensayo filosófico (con pautas que se anexan) que incluirá ADMINISTRACION NACIONAL DE EDUCACION PUBLICA.

This paper offers a new interpretation of Thales’ claim that “all things are full of gods”. Rather than its relating to soul, such that Thales is a panpsychist, as it is commonly understood, I argue that the claim is better understood to relate to water, his archē. I argue that in regard to soul Thales makes an important contribution, connecting soul to the origination of motion, likely to all origination of motion. However, for this role soul need not, and indeed should not, be present in every single thing. The outlines of Thales’ natural philosophy thus emerge. He supposes that what existed first in the world and generated everything else is not (as in Homer and Hesiod) a mythic, semi-anthropomorphized being but rather is a stuff—water. At the same time, by virtue of having this generative role (and, indeed, having soul), water merits the attribution of divinity that had been afforded to these mythic beings.

This paper advances a new interpretation of the manner in which Anaxagoras regards nous as producing motion and, in so doing, explains Anaxagoras’ emphasis on nous’s purity and offers a major reassessment of the explanatory value of nous. Based on a fresh examination of the evidence, I argue that Anaxagoras holds that considerable difference between things is itself productive of motion. On account of nous’s purity there is always a difference between nous and the mixture (comprising everything else) such as to produce motion, with the specific sort of motion being determined by nous’s intent (based on its judgement) or affect. Taking into account what nous brings about, including the cosmic vortex that orders the world and the preservation of living things (by being present in them as their soul), Anaxagoras can be recognized as having offered the framework for a wide-reaching teleology with his conception of nous.

This paper attempts to reconstruct the Stoics’ theory (or theories) of the nature of the moon and its illumination from the fragmentary, and sometimes apparently conflicting, evidence. It reveals how the Stoics accounted for the distinctive characteristics of the moon by intricately utilising their mixture theory (especially κρᾶσις) and their elemental theory in their doctrines of the moon’s composition and the moon’s illumination. The evidence, I conclude, points to a singular, complex Stoic theory, one according to which the moon does not (as scholars have commonly supposed) have any light of its own. The details of this theory additionally furnish important new insights into the Stoic doctrines of κρᾶσις and πνεῦμα.

This paper examines Diogenes of Apollonia’s doctrines of intellection (νόησις) and soul in relation to his material principle, air. It argues that for Diogenes both intellection and soul are not, as commonly thought, some sort of air (namely, warm air), even though both intellection and soul are to be understood in terms of air and the system of τρόποι of air that he has set up. These new interpretations of intellection and soul yield insight into Diogenes’ claims about the ordering activity of air as intellection and a renewed appreciation for his material monism.